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Lexington Theological Seminary
John Wyclif’s metaphysical realism is well documented, as is the role it plays
in his biblical exegesis. Indeed, notable scholars have observed how Wyclif’s
Christian Neoplatonism goes hand in hand with his view of Scripture.1 What
has not received due attention is the way in which Wyclif’s understanding
of universals corresponds to his specifically Christological view of Scripture.
In fact, Wyclif’s threefold system of universals bears a striking similarity to
that outlined by the sixth-century Neoplatonist Simplicius, and, in turn,
corresponds markedly to Wyclif’s division of Scripture into five and three
levels.2 As we shall see, because Wyclif equates Scripture with Christ the
Word, in whom all the divine ideas dwell, such an equation results in a very
dynamic view of Scripture. For rather than subsisting as a static eternal book,
Scripture, in its different levels, functions as a vital extrapolation of Christ
the Word. In this article, I have three basic objectives. The first is to show the
similarity between Wyclif’s theory of universals and the Neoplatonic model
presented by Simplicius. Secondly, I plan to examine the place of Christ
the Word within that system. Having done these things, the stage is set for
demonstrating the connection between Wyclif’s system of universals and his
understanding of Scripture’s own nature and composition.
1. Samuel Harrison Thomson, “The Philosophical Basis of Wyclif’s Theology,”
The Journal of Religion 11:1 (1931): 86–116; J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 115–95; Anthony Kenny, Wyclif
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1–30, 56–67; Gordon Leff, History of Heresy
in the Later Middle Ages Vol. 2 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967),
500–16; “The Bible and Eternity: John Wyclif’s Dilemma,” Journal of Warburg and
Courtauld Institutes 27 (1964): 73–89; reprinted in Studies in Medieval Thought and
Learning from Abelard to Wyclif (London: Hambledon Press, 1981): 399–415. A. J.
Minnis, “‘Authorial Intention’ and the ‘Literal Sense’ in the Exegetical Theories of
Richard Fitzralph and John Wyclif,” Proceedings of the Irish Academy 75 (1975): 1–31.
2. An anonymous reader of a book proposal I submitted to a publisher noted
the similarity between Wyclif’s system of universals there outlined and that of the
Neoplatonist school. Intrigued by this comment, I pursued the connection, and in
the process saw the further relationship with Wyclif’s theory of Scripture. I remain
indebted to this reader for that initial insight.
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PART I. WYCLIF’S NEOPLATONIC SYSTEM
OF UNIVERSALS
John Wyclif was a thoroughgoing realist, firmly imbedded in the tradi-
tion of Christian Neoplatonism championed by such figures as Augustine,
Anselm and Grosseteste. Absolutely opposed to nominalism, Wyclif makes
no bones about his contempt for the doctores signorum. Still, it should be
remembered, as A. C. Lloyd points out, that the pagan Neoplatonists were
almost all ‘nominalists’ in the broad sense of the term, inasmuch they denied
extra-mental existence to the universals represented by general expressions.
While, strictly speaking, ‘conceptualist’ would be the more accurate designa-
tion, they clearly were not ‘realists’ in the Platonic sense.3 At any rate, in his
commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Simplicius (nominalist/conceptualist)
recounts the Neoplatonic system of the three-fold universal, itself inherited
from Middle Platonism. Here Simplicius designates the first sort of universal
as the causal, that first genus, such as the first animal which makes animality
for animals. This is the universale ante rem. The second sort of universal is
produced by the first and only exists in individuals; it is the universale in re.
And the third only exists in the intellect, inasmuch as it is abstracted from
the particular, and is thus the universale post rem.4 Simplicius’ commentary
was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1266. For the Greek
τριττ ..οv τ ..οKοιvo´v, Moerbeke’s Latin offers the triplex commune, the first of
which, transcending individuals, is the causa communitatis. The second is the
commune which is distributed to individuals by their common cause, and
thus resides within them. And the third sort is the abstraction existing in
intellectibus.5
A Bachelor of Arts at Oxford by 1356, Wyclif’s earlier student days
seem to have included an attraction to the nominalism he later came to
abhor, admitting that it was a long time before he learned from Scripture
a genuine understanding of ideas, now thanking God and his holy servants
3. A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),
68–69.
4. Simplici in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium ed. Carolus Kalbfleisch
(Berolini: 1908), 82;35–83;20. Cf. Lloyd,The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, 67–68; Lloyd,
Form and Universal in Aristotle (ARCA classical and medieval texts, papers and mono-
graphs, 4; Liverpool, 1981), 62–64.
5. In Praedicamenta Aristotelis V, ed. A. Pattin vol. 1 (Louvain: University of
Louvain, 1971), 110–11: “Forte igitur summendum triplex commune, hoc quidem
exemptum a singularibus et causa communitatis . . . Secundum autem est commune
quod a communi causa differentibus speciebus distribuitur et inest ipsis, sicut id
quod in unoquoque animal; tertium autem quod in nostris intellectibus per abstrac-
tionem consistit, posterium genitum existens. . . ” On the date of the translation cf.
Pattin’s introduction, xi–xviii.
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like Augustine for finally enlightening him.6 This admission is instructive
not only in tracing the development of Wyclif’s thought, but also because it
points out the inexorable connection Wyclif found between Scripture and
realism. Scripture is the place where one learns about metaphysics. After all,
he credits Moses with speaking of the beasts fashioned in their genus and
species, namely the universal natures communicated to many particulars.7
What is more, Wyclif was quite convinced that Aristotle and Porphyry, as
well as the Christian writers Boethius and Gilbert de la Porre´e, understood
universals properly, and were thus in agreement with Scripture.8
While Wyclif may have been a nominalist early on, by the time he was a
Master of Arts in 1360 his realist metaphysical system was in place, evinced
in the earliest of his surviving works, De logica, written just about this time.9
If Wyclif was indebted to anyone for the system of universals he presents
in this work, one might expect a reference to that source by the young
scholar. Yet in what is an otherwise standard outline of logic, he presents
his system of universals as if it were perfectly commonplace, like the rest of
the material he is explaining. The second chapter opens with a threefold
classification of universals. “The first is the universal of causation, such as
God, the sun, the moon etc.; the second is the universal of communication,
such as human nature, or angelic etc., and they are called universals of com-
munication because they are universal natures, communicated to a number
of subjects. And in this way human nature is communicated to all individuals
of the human species. . . . The third is the universal of representation, such
as those terms ‘man, ‘animal’ and ‘stone,’ whether they be written terms,
spoken terms, or intentions in the mind.” Thus the last category pertains
6. De dominio divino I, ix, ed. Reginald Lane Poole (London: 1890; reprint;
Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 63: “Et diu fuit antequam ex Scripturis intellexi istam
sentenciam de ydeas; quam cum illustratus a Deo perfunctorie repperissem, cum
gaudio gracias egi Deo, cum suo famulo Augustino et aliis quos Deus eternaliter
ordinat ad hoc ministeraliter me iuvare.”
7. Tractatus de universalibus ii, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985), 69: “Nam quando ille eximius philosophus et propheta Moyses dixit,Genesis 1:
‘producat terra animam viventem in genere suo, iumenta, reptilia et bestias terrae
secundum species suas,’ non intellexit terminum vel conceptum humanum per
‘genus’ et ‘speciem,’ sed naturae universales communicatas multis suppositis. . . ”
Cf. De dominio divino II, i, 176–77: “Tercio confirmatur idem ex testimonio Scripture,
que, ubicumque loquitur de genere vel specie, intelligit non conceptus in anima vel
res secunde imposicionis, sed res extra intentas principaliter a natura: ut Gen. i. 12
dicitur quod Deus produxit terre nascencia secundum genus et species suas. . . ”
8. De universalibus i, 43: “Ex istis facile est videre sensum Aristotelis, Porphyrii,
Gliberti, Boethii et aliorum loquentium compendiose et vere de virtute sermonis,
de universalibus et de omnibus non dissonant a Scriptura.”
9. For the dating of Wyclif’s works cited throughout (with one exception)
cf. Williell R. Thomson, The Latin Writings of JohnWyclyf (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1983).
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to the term which then represents the extra-mental universal of the second
type.10
A few years later, in his 1365 De ente in communi, Wyclif again offers
the ‘triplex universale’ consisting of the universal of causation, which is the
cause of many things; the universal of communication, which is common
to many singulars; and the universal of signification, which functions as a
term signifying the second order of universals.11 And by the time of his De
universalibus, which Mueller dates to 1374,12 Wyclif again posits three types
of universals: “The first is the universal of causation, as God is the most
universal cause, and after him there are the created universals according
to the order by which they originate from God. The second is the universal
of communication, just as, for instance, a reality is communicated to many
subjects, as is the case with human nature and other common and specific
natures. The third is the universal of representation, which is a sign of
the prior universals, and these are only called universals equivocally, as
a picture of a man is equivocally the man.”13 Here then, in these three
descriptions, we have Moerbeke’s causa communitatis, namely the universale
causatione; Moerbeke’s commune, namely the universale communicatione; and
finally Moerbeke’s abstracted universal located in intellectibus, which is the
universale repraesentatione. And while Wyclif prefers the term ‘universale’ to
Moerbeke’s ‘commune,’ the meaning is the same.
Despite this similarity, Wyclif never mentions Simplicius by name in his
writings. Might he still have read Moerbeke’s translation, though? There
10. De logica I, ii, ed, Michael Henry Dziewicki (London: 1893; reprint, New
York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 8: “Iam consequenter dicendum est de universal-
ibus, supponendo primo quod tripliciter dicitur universale: primum est universale
causacione, utDeus, sol, luna etc.; secundum est universale communicacione, ut natura
humana, sive angelica etc.; et dicuntur universalia communicacione, quia sunt uni-
versales naturae, communicate pluribus suppositis. Et sic natura humana communi-
catur omnibus individuis speciei humane . . . Tercium est universale representacione;
sicut isti termini, homo, animal, lapis, sive sint termini scripti, sive termini vocales,
sive intenciones in anima cum illis convertibiles. Et dicuntur universalia representa-
cione, quia principaliter representant universalia a parte rei, sicut iste terminus,
homo, respresentat principaliter vel primarie naturam humanam, que natura est
species universalis ominium hominum, et universale a parte rei. . . ”
11. De ente in communi I, iv, ed. S. Harrison Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1930), 54–55: “Est igitur triplex universale, scilicet universale causacione, ut quilibet
causa multorum, universale communicacione, ut commune quod est multorum
singulum, et universale signacione ut terminus signans universale secundo modo
dictum.”
12. Cf. Mueller’s introduction to Tractatus de universalibus, xxix–xxx.
13. De universalibus i, 15–16: “Primo quod triplex est maneries universalium in
genere. Primum est universale causatione, ut Deus est causa universalissima et post
eum res universales creatae secundum ordinem, quo originatur a Deo. Secundus est
universale communicatione, ut puta res communicata multis suppositis, ut natura
humana et aliae naturae generales et specificae. Tertium est universale repraesen-
tatione, ut signa priorum universalium, quae aequivoce dicuntur universalia sicut
homo pictus aequivoce homo.”
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are twelve extant manuscripts containing the translation, none of which
is in England.14 And while Wyclif’s beloved Grosseteste had translated
Simplicius’ commentary on the De caelo, there is no record of his having
translated the Categories commentary.15 And, as noted, Wyclif makes no
mention of having read of this system, nor of anyone having taught it to
him. In fact, as Robson notes, there is no record of Wyclif having studied
under a specific master. Rather, his debt was to theologians of the past, from
Augustine to Anselm, and of course Grosseteste.16 As to where he might
have encountered the Neoplatonist threefold universal, even if uncred-
ited, the most likely answer is Grosseteste, but Grosseteste does not present
this threefold system. Perhaps Wyclif’s version is simply a modification of
Grosseteste’s own system, which Wyclif specifically recounts in his own Trac-
tatus de universalibus. Here he refers to Grosseteste’s commentary on the
Posterior Analytics, and attributes five categories of universals to him. The
first is the eternal exemplar idea residing in God; the second is the common
created reason residing in celestial spheres; the third is the common form
found in singulars; the fourth is the common form in its accidents; and the
fifth is the sign or concept.17 Notwithstanding the similarity, Wyclif does not
claim here, or in his earlier works, to have modified Grosseteste’s system.
And it is interesting to note that modern scholars simply accept Wyclif’s
system as his own device, born of a general adherence to the long Christian
Neoplatonist tradition.18 Of course, Wyclif could have cobbled it together
himself; the constituent parts were all there for him to arrange as he saw
fit. But the articulation of the system does run quite close to Simplicius.
No matter how Wyclif did arrive at such a system, his application of this
14. Cf. Pattin’s introduction, vol 1, xxiii–xxxix.
15. Cf. James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
86; Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philos-
ophy ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 74–79.
16. Robson, 144.
17. De universalibus ii, 59: “Primo quod est dare quinque maneries universalium,
ut declarat Lincolniensis, I Posteriorum, capitulo 7. Primum et supremum genus est
ratio vel idea exemplaris aeterna in Deo. Secundum genus est ratio communis creata
in causis superioribus, ut intelligentiis et orbibus caelestibus. Tertium genus univer-
salium est forma communis fundata in suis individuis. Et illa, inquit Lincolniensis,
sunt genera et species de quibus loquitur Aristoteles. Quarto: forma communis
in suis accidentibus, apprehensa ab intellectu infimo, est universale. Sed quintum
modum universalium—pro signis vel actibus intellegendi—dimmittit Lincolniensis
ut sibi impertinens.” Cf. Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros I,7 ed. Pietro
Rossi (Florence: 1981), 139–41. See Kenny’s discussion of these five levels in “The
Realism of the De universalibus,” in Wyclif in His Times ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986), 23-34.
18. In addition to the works cited at the outset, condider Paul Vincent Spade’s
detailed and erudite account of Wyclif’s theory of universals and predication in the
introduction to Kenny’s translation, On Universals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985),
vii–xlvii.
232 IAN CHRISTOPHER LEVY
Neoplatonic order to Holy Scripture is especially interesting. And it is to
that relationship we now turn.
PART II. THE WORD INWHOM ALL THINGS WERE MADE
That Wyclif credits Scripture with teaching him a proper metaphysical sys-
tem coincides with the prominent role that Christ plays in Wyclif’s realist
hierarchy. Christ the Word is the site of the exemplar reasons, the essential
foundation in whom all things were made.19 Thus, in his 1374 De dominio
divinio, when addressing Paul’s declaration in Ephesians 1:4 that, “[God]
elegit nos in ipso [Christ]ante mundi constitutionem,” Wyclif calls exemplar rea-
sons the eternal universals which are necessarily presupposed with respect
to the existence of a creature. This scriptural passage is an instance, he says,
where one must distinguish between the existence of the creature and the
means by which it subsists through the exemplar reason or divine essence.
It is the creature’s exemplar reason which was in God before the foundation
of the world. And while the creature is not God, it is still the same as God
in its exemplar reason, precisely because the reasons belong to the divine
intellect and thus to the divine essence.20 In Christ subsists that first category
of universal, that causal principle which is the universale ante rem.
For Wyclif, the eternal truths are identical with God inasmuch God
causes them, though formally speaking they are distinct both from each
other and from God.21 Wyclif would thus agree with Aquinas that the
exemplar reasons are not the self-subsisting ideas of Plato, since according
19. De dominio divino I, vi, 39: “Tunc enim cognoscemus quomodo Christus
secundum raciones exemplares est omnia in omnibus illapsus, ut dicit apostolus, I
Cor. xv. 28. Ipse autem est fundamentum essenciale, quod secundum esse vitale
adintra est omnia, iuxta illud Ioh. i. 3, 4, Quod factum est ipso vita erat.”
20. De dominio divino I, ix, 62–63: “Et iste raciones exemplares sunt universalia
eterna, que sunt necessario presupposita ad existenciam creature . . . quia equivo-
catur in medio a racione exemplari vel divina essencia ad existeciam creature. Et si
queritur, quid hoc est, ante mundi constitutionem, dicitur quod racio exemplaris et per
consequens Deus; et hoc est ista creatura: et tamen ista creatura non est Deus, sed
idem Deo in racione exemplari, et secundum esse intelligibile adintra est Deus.”
21. De ente librorum duorum excerpta i, ed Michael Henry Dziewicki. (London:
1909; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 6: “Ulterius quo ad dictum
sancti Thome et Lyncolniensis in libris suis de veritate, patet que intendunt, sicut et
quicunque alii probabiliter sapientes in ista materia, quod nulla talis veritas, quamvis
sit eterna a parte ante, dicit aliquam essenciam vel naturam sic eternam, nisi solum
deum. Unde in predicacione secundum causam concedunt doctores quod quelibet
talis veritas est deus, sicut scriptura vocat deum illuminacionem, resurreccionem,
et quotlibet talia; cum sit omnia in omnibus. Et tamen, loquendo formaliter, non
dubium quin distinguntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet per Augustinum de ydeis
83 questionum questione 46. Nec est michi verissimile quod tam venerablis cetus
doctorum Parisiensium dampnaret dictum articulum, nisi secundum sensum falsum
et causam racionalem.”
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to his essence God is the likeness of all things, such that the idea in God is
nothing other than the divine essence itself.22 Yet Wyclif did in fact think
Aristotle had misrepresented Plato, who was likely in agreement with Holy
Scripture.23 At any rate, Thomas knew that divine simplicity would be com-
promised if the divine intellect were formed by the many things it knows.
Hence, the many ideas in the divine mind are there as things known by
God. In other words, their being derives from their being known.24 And
so for Wyclif, while God knows his creation primarily through universals
and secondarily through individuals, divine simplicity is never impaired
since these universals of the first order exist in God as second intentional
concepts.25 Despite the similarity between the two theologians, one should
remember that Aquinas does not call such exemplar reasons ‘universals,’
inasmuch as universals for him exist only in singulars.26 Wyclif, in the
Neoplatonist vein outlined by Simplicius, equates the highest level of uni-
versals with the exemplars, as causal principles, while his second level cor-
responds to Aquinas’ universale in re.
PART III. CHRIST THE ETERNAL SCRIPTURE
The system illustrated above has a direct bearing on Wyclif’s description of
Scripture. Scholars such as Minnis, Robson and Smalley have commented
22. Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 1 (Taurin: 1950), 90: “Dicendum quod Deus
non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se existentem. Et sic etiam Aristoteles im-
probat opinionem Platonis de ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes,
non in intellectu . . . Dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo
omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia.”
23. De universalibus ii, 60–61: “Sed Dominus Albertus, Sanctus Thomas et alii
glossantes Aristotelem cum favore dicunt quod Aristoteles aequivocavit cum Platone,
intellegendo eum dixisse quod ideae sunt substantiae per se entes, separatae a
Deo et individuis. Quod non est intelligibile, cum talia monstruosissime superflue-
rent. . . Probabilius tamen videtur mihi quod Plato sane sensit de ideis cum Scriptura
nostra sacra, sicut de eo Augustinus testatur, Octoginta trium quaestionum, quaestio
47, et Eustratus, ubi supra.”
24. ST I, q. 15, a. 2, 91: “Hoc autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet,
facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut
quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens
intellectum in actu. . . . Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus, quod
multa intelligat: sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures eius intellectus
formaretur. Unde plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso.” Cf.
W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas
in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought ed. Dominic J.
O’Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 122–23.
25. Stephen Lahey, “Wyclif and Lollardy,” in The Medieval Theolgians ed. G. R.
Evans (London: Basil Blackwell, 2001), 336.
26. Contra Gentiles I, c. 65 in Opera Omnia vol. 12 (Paris: Vives, 1880), 70: “Uni-
versalia autem non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus, ut
probatur in septimo Metaphysicorum, c. XIII.”
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upon the effect Wyclif’s Neoplatonism had on his understanding of Scrip-
ture, generally regarding that effect as negative. For Minnis, Wyclif built
“a castle in the air, in honour of the liber vitae. His enthusiasm for the
Word of God in the Neoplatonic sense blinds him to the flesh and blood
reality of scribes, compilers, and authors.”27 Acknowledging the vitality of
Wyclif’s view of Scripture as the life-giving Word, Minnis finds that Wyclif
refuses to recognize Scripture as “a book per se,” given his exaltation of the
highest level of Scripture as the Book of Life. All of this, says Minnis, leads
Wyclif to eschew the subtle literary classifications that late medieval exegetes,
such as Lyra and FitzRalph, employed to differentiate the various senses of
the text.28 While Robson also finds that Wyclif’s estimation of Scripture
as the eternal truth led him into countless difficulties, he too is aware of the
dynamic quality of Scripture, writing that for Wyclif, “the Word of Scripture
was God Himself, an emanation of the Supreme Being ‘transposed into
writing.”’29 Smalley likewise notes that Wyclif associated Scripture with an
emanation from the divine being. Likening him to Plotinus, she concludes
that Wyclif wound up destroying time itself in his effort the preserve the eter-
nal validity of scriptural discourse.30 These points are well taken, for there is
no question but that Wyclif’s system led him into exegetical difficulties. The
present study cannot take up the closely related, though separate, matter
of exegesis, as that would take us too far afield. Nevertheless, the above
observations do serve to highlight that it is precisely the dynamic quality of
Wyclif’s Scripture which can produce such results. Yet this dynamic quality
does not derive simply from the fact that Scripture is divine in nature, but
rather that it is specifically Christological in nature. And that is, in turn,
intimately bound to the larger role of Christ the Word, source of all being,
dwelling place of the eternal exemplar reasons.
In his 1376 De civili dominio, Wyclif described Scripture as the Book
of Life and the eternal truths grounded therein, while the manuscripts are
called Scripture in an equivocal sense, as a remote picture humanly imposed
for the sake of signifying the prior, higher levels of Scripture. Moreover,
once one deforms Scripture with an erroneous sense it ceases to be Holy
Scripture, just as the defaced image is no longer the man depicted. And yet
the catholic who devoutly understands the truth possesses Scripture in his
soul.31 The content of Scripture, those truths which it bears, is Scripture,
27. Minnis, 13.
28. Minnis, 13–14.
29. Robson, 146. For Robson’s views on the deleterious effect of Wyclif’s re-
alism on his exegesis, especially in the context of his 1372–74 debate with John
Kenningham cf. ibid., 156–70.
30. Smalley, 410–14.
31. De civili dominio III, xix, ed. Johann Loserth (London: 1904; reprint, New
York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 403–04: “Istud autem dubium relinquo loycis
pertractandum, solicitus ad intelligendum librum vite et veritates eternas in ipso fun-
datas; quorum uterque est scriptura sacra. Codices autem nostros voco scripturam
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and the truths are none other than all that is found in the Eternal Word.
Thus the catholic who grasps Christ in his soul has Scripture.
By the time of his 1378 De veritate sacrae scripturae, Wyclif contends that
Scripture has five different levels: “I have been in the habit of describing
Holy Scripture as the inscription of sacred truth, whether in its revealing
of other truths, or insofar as it is the very revelation of truth itself. I have
customarily posited five levels of Holy Scripture. The first is the Book of Life,
which Apocalypse speaks of in Chapters 20 and 21. The second consists of
the truths inscribed in the Book of Life, according to their intelligible being.
Both levels of these Scriptures are absolutely necessary, although they do
not differ essentially, but rather according to reason, as I said of this matter
in On Ideas. On the third level, Scripture is considered in light of the truths
which are to be believed in their proper genus. These are inscribed in the
Book of Life according to existence and effect. The fourth level considers
Scripture in light of the truth which must be believed as it is inscribed in
the book of the natural man, that is, in his mind. Some people call this
Scripture an aggregate abstracted from actions and truths, spoken of in the
third manner. For some this is an intellective habit, and for others it is an
intention or species. Yet in the fifth manner, Holy Scripture is understood
as referring to the manuscripts, sounds or other artificial signs designed to
bring to mind that first truth.”32
As the argument continues, Wyclif proceeds to equate Scripture with
Christ himself. The Gospel of John provides him with the proof that Christ
is identical with Scripture, for Christ is the Scripture God sent into the
world: “et non potest solvi scriptura quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum
(Jn 10:35–36).” Actually, Wyclif had been equating Scripture with Christ as
early as 1372, when arguing in hisDe benedicta incarnacione that the hypostatic
union cannot be separated. Much of this material would re-appear almost
sacram equivoce tercio modo dictam; equivoce dico, quia non est nisi pictura remota
humanitus imposita ad significandum scripturas priories. . . . Unde difformans ipsa
per sensum erroneum facit ea tunc non esse scripturam sacram, sicut deturpans
ymaginem facit ut tunc non sit homo pictus; verumtamen catholicus pie intelligens
habet scripturam sacram in anima.”
32. De veritate sacrae scripturae I, vi, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (London: 1905;
reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 108–09: “unde solebam ponere
quinque gradus scripture sacre: primus est liber vite, de quo Apoc. vicesimo et
vicesiomo uno, secundus est veritates libro vite inscripte secundum esse earum
intelligibile, et utraque istarum scripturarum est absolute necessaria, non differens
essentialiter, sed secundum racionem, ut dictum est in matteria De Ydeis. tercio
sumiter scriptura pro veritatibus credendis in genere, que secundum existenciam
vel effectum inscribuntur libro vite. quarto sumiter scriptura pro veritate credenda,
ut inscribitur libro hominis naturalis ut anima, quam scripturam quidam agregatum
ex actibus et veritatibus tercio modo dictis, quidam, quod est habitus intellectivus,
et quidam quod est intencio vel species. sed quinto modo sumitur scriptura sacra
pro codicibus, vocibus aut aliis artificialibus, que sunt signa memorandi veritatem
priorem.”
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verbatim five years later in De veritate sacrae scripturae. As Christ the Truth
speaks here in John 10, he is not referring to Scripture as that artificial
aggregate made up of the pelts of dead animals; after all, those scriptures
are destroyed on a daily basis. Rather, he means the Book of Life in which all
things are inscribed, that is, the intrinsic Word of God, the Second Person
of the Trinity. And this is authenticated by the Third Person, who leaves
us an example by speaking of the “living Scripture.” Supplying the relative
pronoun in the masculine gender (quem Pater sanctificavit), the Holy Spirit
thus marks the relationship with the Son.33
When Wyclif picks up this theme in De veritate sacrae scripturae one
finds the “whole Trinity” at work again. The Word in his divinity sent
himself into the world, for in his humanity he is the nobleman of Luke
19:12 who went off to a distant country to receive his kingship and then
return. That this book i.e., Christ cannot be destroyed is verified by the
fact that his divinity and humanity are insolubly united in a single per-
son. Again it is both a Christological and a Trinitarian matter, as we read
of the Holy Spirit so ordaining the correct manuscripts to read the rel-
ative pronoun in the masculine (quem), thus referring to Christ. For as
Christ is fully human, born of a woman, and fully divine, begotten not
made, so God ‘made’ the manuscripts sacred in regard to Christ’s hu-
manity, while he ‘begot’ Scripture and ‘caused’ it to be sacred with re-
spect to his divinity, with the result that Scripture must be supremely au-
thentic, surpassing all sensible signs.34 For the sensible Scripture found in
manuscripts is only Holy Scripture in an equivocal sense, as one might say the
painted image of a man is the man himself.35 This is the Scripture liable to
33. Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione v, ed. Edward Harris (London: 1896;
reprint, Johnson Reprint Co., 1966), 72: “Primo quod Veritas non loquitur de scrip-
tura nostra artificiali aggregata ex ficturis atramenti et pellibus mortuorum; tum
quia talis scriptura cottidie per artifices potest solvi . . . Unde Spiritus Sanctus ad
relinquendum nobis exemplar, quod loquitur de scriptura vitali, subdit in genere
masculino—‘quem Pater sanctificavit’—innuendo nobis relacionem faciendum ad
Filium.” Cf. Thomas Geoffrey Oey, Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture within the Context of
His Doctrinal and Social Ideas (unpublished diss., Vanderbilt Univ., 1991), 181–192.
Oey believes that Wyclif has in mind here those who argue that the hypostatic union
could be disolved potentia Dei absoluta.
34. De veritate I, vi, 109–110: “ymmo tota trinitas et per consequens ipsummet
verbum divinitus misit se ipsum, humanitus est homo nobilis, quo abiit in regionem
longinquam accipere sibi regnum et reverti. iste liber non potest solvi . . . ordinavit
spiritus sanctus in correctis codicibus hoc relativum ‘quem’ et non ‘quam’ . . . deus
ergo fecit dictam scripturam sanctam quoad humanitatem, et genuit vel causavit
sanctam quoad divinitatem. et patet ex fide scripture, quod oportet esse scripturam
summe autenticam preter signa sensibilia.”
35. De veritate I, vi, 111: “unde ista scriptura sensibilis in vocibus vel codicibus
non est scriptura sacra nisi equivoce, sicut homo pictus vel ymaginatus dicitur homo
propter similititudinem ad verum hominem.”
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destruction in the jaws of dogs and contamination at the hands of fool and
heretics.36
The composition and subsequent plight of Scripture is remarkably close
to that of Christ the Incarnate Word. Just as Christ is fully God and fully
man, so Scripture can be seen as the product of a hypostatic union, namely
the Divine Word and parchment. The Word assumed perishable flesh, liable
to injury and death at the hands of sinners, and so too the Word is united
to cured goat hide, liable to scribal error and the yet worse blasphemous
senses imposed upon it by impious sophists. Yet as Christ could not suffer
in his impassible divinity, so the Word, the Book of Life, cannot be altered
or destroyed in its eternal truth. Those who deface Scripture can do no
damage to the truth preserved in the devout catholic soul where Christ, the
substance of Scripture, dwells.
The dynamic quality of Scripture comes to the fore now. By ‘dynamic’
one means an active power at work in the world. Christ the creative Word of
God, source of all being, is active in Scripture as both the content of Divine
Truth and the very one who reveals it. The Truth is present in Scripture
more permanently than any place else, says Wyclif, inasmuch as Scripture is
eternal and indelible, the very radiance of eternal light, that flawless mirror
of divine majesty spoken of in Wisdom 7:26. What is more, this Truth is
the very cause of the inexorable nexus formed between the written book,
the truths therein, and the writer himself. The Eternal Word is the thus
the locus of the hypostatic union. Here is the Word of Life (Jn 14:6), the
very gospel Paul proclaimed to the Galatians (Gal 1:6–9).37 And because
Scripture is a mirror of the divine will those who live by faith may trust that
the Truth himself will deign to descend and instruct them, free from all
deception.38
As Wyclif speaks of Scripture in this manner it becomes clear that Scrip-
tura Sacra is interchangeable with Veritas and Sophia, the Truth and Wisdom
which are none other than the Verbum, that is the Second Person of the Holy
Trinity. Thus to hold up all doctrines to the eternal mirror of Scripture is
to judge them in light of a living, eternal Person, not some vague, ethereal
book hovering above the plane of human affairs. Scripture is a ‘who’ not
36. De veritate I, vi, 111: “. . . ymmo a cane solubilis et corrigibilis a scurra sicut
maculabilis, et omnis scriptura foret a quotlibet hominibus hereticabilis. . . ”
37. De veritate I, vi, 111–12: “veritas enim est ibi permanencior, quia eterna et
indelebilis, liber est serenior, quia candor lucis eterne et speculum sine macula, Sap.
septimo, et est causata ydemptias libri scripti, veritas scripte et persone scribentis,
quod omnia hec tria distincta secundum racionem sunt verbum vite et veritates
in abstracto, Joh quarto decimo, et ista scriptura est evangelium, de quo doctor
gencium ad Gal primo sic loquitur. . . ”
38. De veritate I, xv, 377–78: “. . . quam si deus, qui mentiri non potest, in scrip-
tura sua, que est speculum voluntatis sue, hoc dixerit, igitur verum. nec oportet,
catholicum contendere circa probacionem antecedentis, quia sit sibi scriptura sacra,
sicut debet esse ex fide, et eo ipso magister adest, docens ipsum antecedens et
excitans ad assumptum.”
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a ‘what.’ Moreover, it is this Eternal Person who became incarnate and
offered testimony to Truth in word and deed, thereby providing the Church
with a perfect example of the sacred conduct which brings the faithful into
conformity with the creative Word, the source and principle of all being.
Thus to the extent that any exegetical difficulties arise on account of Wyclif’s
doctrine of the eternal Scripture, we must always bear in mind that he
regards the words of Scripture as the words of Christ the Word, the one who
cannot lie. Wyclif is concerned with the veracity of a Living Person, not the
correctness of a fixed record.
By the time of his 1382 Trialogus, Wyclif has narrowed down his five-
fold Scripture to a tri-partite system, though the Christological theme is still
intact. “As I should speak more succinctly, you must remember that there is
some equivocation with regard to the term ‘Scripture.’ First of all, the term
‘Holy Scripture’ signifies Jesus Christ, the Book of Life, in whom every truth
is inscribed, in keeping with John 10: ‘the Scripture cannot be broken, whom
God sanctified and sent into the world.’ In the second manner, it signifies
the truths inscribed in the very Book of Life, whether they are the eternal
exemplar reasons or other temporal truths. In the third manner, which
is better known to the general public, it signifies that aggregate which is
derived both from the manuscripts of God’s law, and from the truth which
God imposes upon them. Yet this bare material Scripture should not be
called Holy Scripture, inasmuch as these manuscripts are only sacred to the
extent that the sacred meaning accompanies them.”39
Both the earlier fivefold version, and this condensed version, seem
strikingly similar to Wyclif’s system of universals. In both the fivefold and
the threefold systems, Scripture on its highest level is Christ the Word. And
as the Word is the repository of the eternal exemplar reasons, then it seems
the second level of Scripture must be equated with those exemplar reasons.
For just as the exemplar reasons subsisting in the divine intellect are not
distinct from the divine essence, so the truths inscribed in the Book of Life
are not (as he says) essentially different from the Book of Life itself.
Let us look at each level of the fivefold system before comparing the
two systems, level by level. In the fivefold system, the first and highest level is
Christ the Word and Book of Life, thus corresponding to the divine intellect.
The second level corresponds to the truths inscribed therein; these are the
eternal exemplar reasons (universale ante rem). The third level corresponds
39. Trialogus III, xxxi, ed. Gotthard Lechler (Oxford: Claredon Press 1869),
238–39: “Sed ut loquar strictius, notanda est tibi aequivocatio de scriptura. Primo
enim scriptura sacra signat Jesum Christum librum vitae, in quo omnis veritas est
inscripta, juxta illud Johannis x: ‘non potest solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit
et misit in mundum.’ Secundo modo signat veritates in ipso libro vitae inscriptas,
sive sint rationes exemplares aeternae sive veritates aliae temporales. Et tertio modo
famosius quo ad vulgus signat aggregatum ex codicibus legis Dei et ex veritate quam
Deus ipsis imponit; sed hoc nudum scriptum materiale non didici vocare scripturam
sacram, quia illi codices non sunt sacri, nisi illis assit sententia sacra.”
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to the universals existing in the individual subject (universale in re), since
these are “the truths that must be believed in their genus, which according to
existence or effect are inscribed in the Book of Life.” Level four, which is “an
aggregate abstracted from actions and truths of the third level,” corresponds
to the universals existing in mente, here called “intention or species.” These
are the conceptual universals abstracted from particulars (universale post
rem). The fifth and lowest level consists of the written or vocal signs formed
on the basis of these concepts. And bear in mind that the manuscripts i.e.,
the fifth level of Scripture, are only called Scripture in an equivocal sense,
just as his lowest level of universal is only called such equivocally. In fact,
both are specifically compared to the portrait of a man bearing only the
likeness of the real person. For this universale repraesentatione is but a sign of
the prior universals.
With regard to the later threefold version of Scripture, one can chart
the correspondence in the following way: the first level is the divine intel-
lect; while on the second level he locates the “exemplar reasons” (universale
ante rem), as well as the “temporal truths,” namely the universals subsisting
in individual subjects (universale in re). And the last level corresponds to
the signs formed from those abstracted universals which exist in the mind
(universale post rem). The first level in this later version is still that of the
earlier, while the second level now compresses levels two and three of the
earlier version. The lowest levels are the same in each, though level four
of the earlier version, namely the universal existing in mente, is now im-
plicit in the lowest level of the later version, since the level of signification
presupposes a mental concept. Either way, this level refers to the universale
post rem.
Unless I am very much mistaken, therefore, the connection between
these two Scriptural outlines and his threefold universal is so close as to be
the intentional product of a carefully conceived presentation of the rela-
tionship between the structure of divine revelation and that of the cosmic
order.
CONCLUSION
Minnis had said that Wyclif did not regard Scripture as “a book per se.”
This is undoubtedly true, for Wyclif grants to Scripture a genuine person-
hood, that of Christ the Word. Scripture thus assumes the role that a ‘mere
book’ cannot, namely that of living Savior. It is precisely the personhood
of Scripture which gives it the dynamic quality that distinguishes it from a
static volume of immutable laws. The truth of Scripture is grounded not in
laws, but in a person. Scripture is true because Christ is true. Christ is the
Truth, the source and content of divine revelation through the Old and New
Testaments. Yet as the person of Christ, Scripture also performs its salvific
function as a ‘book,’ since it is the immutable truth revealed in the flesh
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of the sensible parchment, proclaiming the highest level of saving gospel.
The parchment and ink present the Word to the senses much as the flesh
and blood of Christ present the Second Person of the Trinity. Just as the
principle of unity in the person of Christ is the person of the Word, which
thus provides the foundation for the hypostatic union, so the highest level of
Scripture is the locus of truth for the lower levels. And yet Wyclif’s account
of Scripture in its different levels bears not only a Christological character,
but speaks to the way in which the Second Person of the Trinity interacts
with the Third Person, who adorns the work of the former. The Word is
the Book of Life sent into the world, and it is the Holy Spirit who preserves
and testifies to the truth of the Word in his ‘humanity’ by protecting those
corrected manuscripts which attest to the highest level of eternal truth.
Wyclif cannot think of Scripture apart from Christology and Trinitarianism,
precisely because he is a creedal theologian, with his eye on the entirety
of sacred tradition. The Church testifies to what the Truth proclaims: the
inseparability of the Godhead and the insoluble union of the person of
Christ.
